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STATE SCHOOL LANDS - Disinterest in the Public Interest: The
Wyoming Supreme Court's Failure to Define "The Great Public Interest" in State School Lands. Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003).
INTRODUCTION

At the end of December 1997, Craig and Gail Anderson's agricultural lease to a section of state school land in Laramie County, Wyoming
was to expire.' The Andersons submitted a renewal lease application to the
Wyoming Office of State Lands and Investments (State Lands Office) proposing an annual lease rate of $4,586.40.2 The State Lands Office received
two competing bids for the lease; one bid was lower than the Andersons, but
the other bid, which was made by William Riedel, offered to pay a lease rate
of $6,000 for the same section.3 Under Wyoming law, the holder of an expiring lease has a preferential right to renew the lease if the holder meets any
competing bid.4 The Andersons met Riedel's bid of $6,000 per year for the
lease, and on January 16, 1998, the interim director of the State Lands Office
awarded the lease to the Andersons.5

Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 226 (Wyo. 2003). Beginning with the 1803 admis1.
sion of Ohio to the United States, Congress granted each new state sections of public land for
the support of common schools. Wade R. Budge, Comment, Changingthe Focus: Managing
State Trust Lands in the Twenty-First Century, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 223, 226
(1999). The school lands grants evolved for over a century, "and played an integral role in
the westward movement and state-making process." Sally K. Fairfax et al., The School Trust
Lands: A Fresh Look at Conventional Wisdom, 22 ENVTL. L. 797, 798 (1992). The land
grants remain significant: out of the 322 million acres originally transferred to the states for
the support of schools, nearly 135 million acres of surface and 152 million acres of mineral
rights continue in state ownership. Id. At statehood, Congress granted sections sixteen and
thirty-six of every township in Wyoming to the state for the support of common schools.
Wyo. Act of Admission, Ch. 664, § 4, 26 Stat. 222 (1890); WYO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
Today, Wyoming's state land trust is comprised of 3.6 million surface acres and 4.2 million
mineral acres.

STATE OF WYOMING OFFICE OF STATE LANDS & INVESTMENTS, STRATEGIC

PLAN FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 2004 THROUGH JUNE 30, 2008, 4, at http://slfweb.state.wy.us/ami/adobe/StrategicPlan.pdf (Sept. 1, 2003).
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P. 3d 223, 226 (Wyo. 2003). The state leases almost all of the
2.
surface estate of the state trust lands for grazing and agricultural use through "4,600 grazing
and agricultural leases, special use leases, and temporary use permits." STATE OF WYOMING
OFFICE OF STATE LANDS & INVESTMENTS, STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1, 2004
THROUGH JUNE 30, 2008, 16, 21, at http://slf-web.state.wy.us/ami/adobe/StrategicPlan.pdf
(Sept. 1, 2003). Surface lease rentals and mineral royalties from oil and gas contribute 99.6%
of total revenue to the state's trust land income, with the large majority of revenue resulting
from mineral leases. STATE OF WYOMING OFFICE OF STATE LANDS & INVESTMENTS,
SUMMARY OF STATE TRUST LAND REVENUE, 1, at http://slfweb.state.wy.us/ami/adobe/SummaryTrust08.pdf (June 30, 2004). In fiscal year 2004, Wyoming trust land revenue totaled
$93,254,321. Id. at 5. Mineral royalties contributed 91% to the total while non-timber surface leasing added another 8%. Id.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226.
3.
Id. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
4.
5.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226.
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Riedel filed an administrative appeal challenging the award of the
lease to the Andersons. After a hearing, the Board of Land Commissioners
(Board) upheld the grant of the lease to the Andersons.7 Riedel then filed a
petition in the First Judicial District of the State of Wyoming for judicial
review of the Board's decision and challenging the constitutionality of the
right-to-renew preference.8 Upon certification to the Wyoming Supreme
Court, the petition was dismissed as "the [c]ourt lacked jurisdiction to review the constitutionality of a statute upon petition for judicial review of an
administrative action." 9 In June 1999, Riedel initiated a declaratory judgment case against the Board and its members challenging the constitutionality of Wyoming's preferential right-to-renew preference.'0 On July 10,
2000, the district court granted the Wyoming Stock Growers Association's
and the Wyoming Wool Growers Association's (Associations) joint motion
to intervene and the Wyoming Farm Bureau Federation's (Federation) separate motion to intervene." Before trial, the district court asked the parties to
brief the issue of whether the United States' conveyance of school lands to
the State of Wyoming imposed a trust on those lands. 12 On October 29,
2001, the district court issued an order stating the school lands were encumbered by a trust that imposed a fiduciary duty on the State to13manage the
lands exclusively for the benefit of the State's common schools.
In November 2001, the district court tried the issue of whether
Wyoming's right-to-renew preference is unconstitutional given the State's
trust duties. 14 The district court granted the intervenor Associations' motion
to dismiss on the grounds that Riedel failed to present "adequate evidence
that the preferential right to renew violates the State's fiduciary responsibili6.
Id. The Wyoming Administrative Procedures Act provides the procedural requirements for an appeal of an administrative decision. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-114 (LexisNexis
2003). If after an administrative appeal a party remains dissatisfied with an agency decision,
the party has a right, subject to the exhaustion of all administrative remedies, to judicial review. Id.
7. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226.
8. Id. Wyoming's right-to-renew statute allows incumbent lease-holders to renew their
leases by meeting higher bids based on the same or similar use of the leased lands. WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
9. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226; see In re Conflicting Lease Applications for Wyo. Agric.
Lease No. 1-7027, 972 P.2d 586, 587 (Wyo. 1999) (dismissing Riedel's initial petition as
neither the district court nor the Wyoming Supreme Court has "authority on review of an
agency decision to hold a statute unconstitutional vel non"); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 16-3-114(c)
(LexisNexis 2003) (outlining procedures for judicial review of agency decisions). The Wyoming Supreme Court has stated that the appropriate course for an aggrieved party when a
statute affording authority to an agency is deemed unconstitutional is a declaratory judgment
action. In re Conflicting Lease Application, 972 P.2d at 587 (citing Wyo. R. App. P. 12.12).
10.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226. Wyoming's right-to-renew preference is articulated in Wyo.
STAT. ANN. §§ 36-5-101 and 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
11.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226.
12.

Id.

13.
14.

Id.at 226-27.
Id.
at 227.
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cross-appealed
ties." 5 Riedel appealed the dismissal and the Associations
16
the court's order that "school lands are held in trust."
The Wyoming Supreme Court held that the lands granted by the
United States to Wyoming for the maintenance of common schools are not
subject to a federal or state constitutional trust, but are subject to a legislatively created statutory trust. 7 If the court had found a federal or state con15.
Id.
Id. See Fairfax et al., supra note 1, at 851, for the following brief summary of basic
16.
trust principles:
A trust is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property in which the
person by whom the title to the property is held is subject to equitable duties to keep or use the property for the benefit of another. Afiduciary relationship places on the trustee the duty to act with strict honesty and
candor and solely in the interest of the beneficiary. The senior of a trust
is the person who creates a trust. The trustee is the person holding property in trust .... The property held in trust is the trust property. The
beneficiary is the person for whose benefit the trust property is held in
trust. The trust instrument is the 'manifestation of the intention of the
settlor' by which property interests are vested in the trustee and beneficiary and the rights and duties of the parties (called the trust terms) are set
forth in a manner that admits of its proof in judicial proceedings.
Id.
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P. 3d 223, 235 (Wyo. 2003). A total of eight briefs, contain17.
ing twenty-four different formulations of the issues on appeal, were filed by the Associations,
the Federation, the State of Wyoming, and Riedel. The Associations argued that neither the
Wyoming Enabling Act nor the Wyoming Constitution created a state school lands trust;
rather both merely created a solemn agreement with the United States. Appellant Wyoming
Stock Growers Association and Wyoming Wool Growers Association Opening Brief, Riedel
v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60). In the alternative, the Associations argued that even if a trust exists, the trust is not governed by common law trust principles. Id.
The Associations countered each of Riedel's arguments and asserted the constitutionality of
Wyoming's right-to-renew preference. Brief of Appellees Wyoming Stock Growers Association and Wyoming Wool Growers Association, Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003)
(No. 02-60). The Federation asserted that the right-to-renew statute is constitutional and
consistent with Wyoming's fiduciary trust obligations. Brief of Appellee Wyoming Farm
Bureau Federation, Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60). The State of
Wyoming argued that the right-to-renew preference is constitutional and compatible with the
state's fiduciary trust obligations. Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming, Riedel v. Anderson,
70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60). Riedel asserted the right-to-renew statute was unconstitutional as it violates: (1)the state's fiduciary trust obligation to receive fair market value
for school lands leases; (2) the Wyoming Enabling Act's prohibition on leases over ten years;
(3) the Wyoming Constitution's requirement to dispose of school lands at public auction; (4)
the Wyoming Constitution's prohibition on granting privileges that directly or indirectly
diminish the amount derived by sale or other disposition of state lands; (5) the state's duty to
ensure benefits are not provided to non-beneficiaries of the school lands at the expense of the
beneficiaries. Brief of Appellant/Appellee William H. Riedel, Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d
223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60). The Associations, the State of Wyoming, and Riedel submitted additional briefs on whether Wyoming's state school lands were subject to a trust. The
Associations' argued that neither the Wyoming Enabling Act nor Wyoming Constitution
created an express or common law trust. Reply Trust Brief of Wyoming Stock Growers As-
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stitutional trust, the rules of trust law would apply to Wyoming's school
lands.' 8 A constitutional trust would require the state and the Board, as trustees, to manage school lands for the sole benefit of the beneficiaries of the
trust, the state's schools.' 9 In contrast, a statutory trust is technically not a
trust, though the rules of trust law apply except as otherwise provided by the
applicable statute. 20 The provisions of the statute creating the statutory trust
"may change most of the generally applicable rules of trust law," and
thereby allow the State and the Board to manage Wyoming's school lands
according to legislative preferences rather than for the sole benefit of the
state's schools. 2' The Riedel court found that concurrent with the creation of
the statutory trust, the legislature created the right-to-renew statute that allows incumbent leaseholders of state lands a preference in renewing their
leases. 22 Further, the court held that the provisions of the right-to-renew
preference did not "violate[] any fiduciary or constitutional constraints on
the State's management of the trust lands. 2 3
This case note will examine the constitutional, statutory, and case
law principles governing state school lands in Wyoming. Against this background, the case note will evaluate the Wyoming Supreme Court's holdings
in Riedel. It will argue the court's determination that state school lands are
subject only to a statutory trust, rather than a constitutional trust, was incorrect. This case note will argue further that the court's less-than-thorough
analysis of the state school lands trust issue caused the court to uphold
Wyoming's right-to-renew preference for grazing leases even though it conflicts with the great public interest. Finally, this case note will urge the
Wyoming Supreme Court to re-examine and strike down the "same or similar use" provision of the right-to-renew preference as it violates the public
interest by restricting income to the school lands trust and creating ranching
as a beneficiary of the trust.

sociation and Wyoming Wool Growers Association, Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo.
2003) (No. 02-60). The State of Wyoming asserted that the Wyoming Constitution creates a
state school lands trust. Trust Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming, Riedel v. Anderson, 70
P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60). Riedel argued that the Wyoming Enabling Act and the
Wyoming Constitution create both an express and common law trust. Riedel's Brief Regarding the Trust Status of School Lands, Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 0260).
18.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. a (2003).
19.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. f (2003). See WILLIAM F. FRATCHER,
ScOTT ON TRUSTS § 2.3 (4th ed. 1987), for a discussion of the Restatement definition of a
trust. See also 63c AM. JuR. 2D Public Lands § 63 (2004), for the rule that the state takes title

of state school lands as a trustee administering the property for the support of public schools
and that the state or its designee "must administer the trust estate under the law applicable to
trustees acting in a fiduciary capacity." Id.
20.
RESTATEMENT (TI-RD) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. a (2003).

21.
22.
23.

Id.
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 235 (2003).

Id.
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BACKGROUND

Wyoming's EnablingAct, Constitution, & Statutes
By the July 1890 Act of Admission, Congress ratified the Wyoming

Constitution, which the citizens of the Territory of Wyoming had adopted in
November 1889.24 The Act of Admission grants sections 16 and 36 of each
25
township to the state for the purpose of maintaining common schools. The

Act specifies that school lands may be disposed of only at public auction and
as
that the legislature has the power to regulate leasing of the lands, so long
26
years."
10
exceed
not
shall
leases
grazing
and
agricultural
of
"the term

24.
Merrill v. Bishop, 287 P.2d 620 (Wyo. 1955) (holding that the provisions of the Act
of Admission ratifying the state constitution have the same effect as an independent act of
Congress enacting the provisions of the constitution).
Wyo. Act of Admission, ch. 664 , § 4, 26 Stat. 222 (1890). In its entirety, section 4
25.
reads
Sections numbered 16 and 36 in every township of said proposed state,
and, where such sections, or any parts thereof, have been sold or otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any act of congress, other
lands equivalent thereto, in legal subdivisions of not less than onequarter-section, and as contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of
which the same is taken, are hereby granted to said state for the support of
common schools, such indemnity lands to be selected within said state in
such manner as the legislature may provide, with the approval of the secretary of the interior; provided, that section 6 of the act of Congress of
August 9, 1888, entitled "An act to authorize the leasing of the school and
university lands in the Territory of Wyoming, and for other purposes,"
shall apply to the school and university indemnity lands of the said State
of Wyoming so far as applicable.
!d. See WYo. CONST. art. XVIII, § I (accepting the grants of land made by the United States
for educational purposes).
Wyo. Act of Admission, Ch. 664, § 5, 26 Stat. 222 (1890). In its entirety, section 5
26.
reads
All lands herein granted for educational purposes shall be disposed of
only at public sale, the proceeds to constitute a permanent school fund,
the interest of which only shall be expended in the support of said
schools. But said lands may, under such regulations as the legislature
shall prescribe, be leased for mineral, grazing, agricultural, or other purposes, provided that the term of agricultural and grazing leases shall not
exceed 10 years; and such land shall not be subject to preemption, homestead entry, or any other entry under the land laws of the United States,
whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but shall be reserved for school purposes only.
Id. See Dir. of the Office of State Lands & Invs. v. Merbanco, 70 P.3d 241 (Wyo. 2003), for
analysis of the term "disposed of' as it relates to the public sale of state school lands.
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The Wyoming Constitution also addresses state school lands.2 7 Under article seven of the constitution, all moneys arising from the sale or lease
of state school lands are perpetual funds and only the annual income from
the funds can be appropriated. 28 Further, "[a]ll funds belonging to the state
for public school purposes ... shall be deemed trust funds in the care of the
state, which shall keep them for the exclusive benefit of the public
schools. ' 29 Income from the perpetual funds along with all rents from the
unsold school lands "shall be exclusively applied to the support of free
schools in every county in the state." 30
In article eighteen of the constitution, the State of Wyoming accepted the United States' grant of lands for educational purposes "with the
conditions and limitations that may be imposed by the act or acts of Congress."
To fulfill the purpose of the congressional land grant, the "proceeds from the sale and rental of all lands ... donated, granted or received,
from the United States or any other source, shall be inviolably appropriated
and applied to the specific purposes specified in the original grant or gifts."32
Article eighteen also creates the Board to administer the state lands.33 Under
the direction of the legislature, the Board shall direct, control, lease and dispose of lands that are granted to the state "for the support and benefit of public schools" and the Board's sale of such land is to "realize the largest possible proceeds. 34
Wyoming statutes further defme the state's relationship with state
school lands.3" Section 36-5-101 encompasses the qualifications of lessees,
lease terms, and rental of public lands. 36 To lease state lands an individual
must have reached the age of majority, be a citizen of the United States or
declared intention to become a United States citizen, have complied with
Wyoming's laws, and be authorized to conduct business in Wyoming. 37 The
rental fee of any lease "shall be based on an economic analysis and shall
reflect at least the fair market value for the same or similar use of the

27.
WYO. CONST. art. VII, Education; State Institutions; Promotion of Health and Morals;
Public Buildings, and art. XVIII, Public Lands and Donations. See also infra notes 28-34 and
accompanying text.
28.
WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 2. State school lands are sections "sixteen and thirty-six in
each township in the state, and the land selected or that may be selected in lieu thereof." Id.
29.
WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 6.
30.
WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 7.
31.
WYO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
32.
WYO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
33.
WYO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
34.
WYO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 3.
35.
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-5-101 to 36-5-117 (LexisNexis 2003). Title thirty-six of
the Wyoming Statutes focuses on public lands and chapter five addresses leasing of public
lands. Id.
36.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-101 (LexisNexis 2003).

37.

Id.§ 101(a).
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land."3 The Board is charged with adopting a formula for determining the
39
fair market value (FMV) of the state lands' leases. The Board's rules do
not define FMV, but the Board relies on a standard definition that FMV
equals "[t]he price in cash, or its equivalent, that the asset would bring by
bona fide bargaining between willing and well-informed buyers and sellers
at the date of acquisition."' 0 Historically, the Board has used the "comparable sales" technique to determine FMV.4 ' This technique relies on two factors to determine FMV: "[1] the proposed nature and scope of the requested
use of the surface; and [2] an analysis of market data for similar uses of
lands in the same area.' 42
Section 36-5-105 of the Wyoming Statutes focuses on the leasing of
43
state lands and an incumbent leaseholder's right-to-renew preference. The
statute requires all state lands leased for "grazing and other agricultural purposes" be leased "in such manner and to such parties as shall inure to the
greatest benefit to the state land trust beneficiaries."" Preference in awarding or renewing leases shall be given to individuals or legal entities meeting
the provisions of section 36-5-101 and "who are the owners, lessees or lawful occupants of adjoining lands, who offer to pay an annual rental at not less
45
than fair market value" for a period of ten years. Further, an incumbent
lease-holder, who has paid rent when due, has not violated the terms of the
lease, and is qualified under section 36-5-101, "shall have a preferred right

38.

Id. § 101(b).

Id. The criteria used by the Board when adopting a formula to determine fair market
39.
value includes:
(i) Readily available data averaged over an adequate number of years to
remove any radical fluctuations;
(ii) Factors which reasonably reflect the true market value of state leases;
(iii) Parameters within which the board can be responsive to changing resource conditions, market demand and industry viability;
(iv) Factors which reasonably reflect the contributions made by the lessee.
Id. Cf. Ronald W. Spahr & Mark A. Sunderman, Additional Evidence on the Homogeneity of
the Value of Government Grazing Leases and Changing Attributes for Ranch Values, 10 J. OF
REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 601 (1995) (arguing against current formulas for FMV calculation of
grazing leases and proposing new method of variable-fee pricing that recognizes the variation
in value of the state lands available for grazing leases).
STATE OF WYO. BD. OF LAND COMM'RS R. & REGs. HANDBOOK, SURFACE AND
40.
MINERAL ESTATE, 3, at http://www.slf-web.state.wy.us/ami/adobe/SURFACE3.pdf (2004).
Id.at 3.
41.
Id.
42.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
43.
Id. § 36-5-105(a).
44.
Id.
45.
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to renew such lease by meeting the highest bid offered which is based on the
fair market value" for the same or similar use of the lease.46
Case Law
The issues in Riedel were whether Wyoming's state school lands
were held in trust, and, if so, what were the state's fiduciary obligations under the trust.47 If the school lands were subject to a federal or state constitutional trust, then the rules of trust law would apply and the state would be
required to manage the trust lands for the sole benefit of the state's schools.48
If the school lands were subject to a statutory trust, the rules of trust law
would continue to apply, but specific statutory provisions could alter the
terms of the trust.49 Thus, as long as the terms of the statutory trust do not
violate the specific constitutional requirements for the school lands, the
lands could be managed according to legislative preference rather than for
the sole benefit of the state's schools.50
In Papasan v. Allain, the United States Supreme Court stated that a
state's interests in federally granted state school lands depends "on the federal laws that transferred that interest."'" The Court noted that "some school
lands grants did not create express trusts and ... other grants did create such
trusts. 52 The Court postulated that one explanation for the inconsistent interpretation of school lands grants may rest in the variation of the terms of
the grants.5 3
In Branson School DistrictRe-82 v. Romer, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit applied the case-by-case analysis advocated
in Papasan.4 Branson involved Colorado voters' passage of Amendment
46.

Id. § 36-5-105 (a), (e). Section 36-5-105 emphasizes the right-to-renew preference,

so much so that the last four lines of (a), which explain the preference, are repeated verbatim

in (e). See Mark A. Sunderman & Ronald W. Spahr, Valuation of Government Grazing
Leases, 9 J. OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH 179, 179-80 (1993), for a comparison of state and
federal grazing leases. The authors postulate that state leases are valued more highly than
federal grazing leases because of they offer greater certainty of future availability and more
reasonable leasing fees. Id. at 191.
47.
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 226 (Wyo. 2003).
48.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. a (2003); RESTATEMENT (THPRD) OF
TRUSTS § 2 cmt. f (2003). See WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, SCOTr ON TRUSTS § 2.3 (4th ed. 1988)
for a discussion of the Restatement definition of a trust.
49.
RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. a (2003).

50.
51.

Id. See supra notes 24-34 and accompanying text.
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 289-91 n.18 (1986).

52.

Id.

53.

Id. Compare, e.g., Lassen v. Ariz. ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 460

(1967) (holding that Arizona school lands grant created an express trust), with Cooper v.
Roberts, 59 U.S. 173, 181-82 (1856) (holding that school lands grant to Michigan did not

create a trust).
54.
Branson Sch. Dist. Re-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 633 (10th Cir. 1998). Citing Papasan, 478 US 265 (1986), the Tenth Circuit stated, "the question of whether a statehood
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16, which rewrote the management principles underlying Colorado's state
school lands.5" The court found constitutional the shift of focus from a
short-term profit maximization to a focus on long-term yields from the state
school lands.56 In reaching its conclusion, the court first determined that the
Colorado Enabling Acting Act contained "sufficient enumeration of duties to
indicate" that Congress intended to create a fiduciary relationship between
57

the state and its common schools with respect to its common school lands.

The holding in Branson was built on the court's foundational definition of a trust.58 A trust results "when a settlor conveys property to a trustee
with a manifest intent to impose a fiduciary duty on that person requiring
that the property be used for a specific benefit of others." 59 The court relied
on the accepted principle that "Congress may create a trust through the
manifestation of an intent to create a fiduciary relationship.'" In expressing
statute creates a federal trust requires a ease-specific analysis of the particular state's enabling
statute because the history of each state's admission to the Union is unique." Branson, 161
F.3d at 633,
Branson, 161F.3d at 625.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 638-39.
Id. at 634. The enumeration of duties includes:
(1) how the school lands are to be disposed, (2) at what minimum price,
(3) how the income from the sales is to be held, (4) what may be done
with the interest on that capital holding, and (5) Congress has provided
for the permanence of the benefit of these assets for the common schools.

Id.
58.

Id. at 633.
Branson Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d at 633 (citing RESTATEMENT (SE cOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 2,
17, 23 and 23 cmt. (a) (1959)). See supra note 16 (summarizing basic trust principles).
60.
Branson Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d at 633 (citing Lassen v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 460 (1967)). In JicarillaApache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp.,
782 F.2d 855, 857(10th Cir. 1984), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
adopted "the prior dissenting opinion of Judge Seymour, reported at 728 F.2d 1555, 1563
(10th Cir. 1984), which stated:

59.

Both the Supreme Court and this circuit have recently set out the test for
determining a trust relationship. In Whiskers v. United States, 600 F.2d
1332 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. t078, . . . we made it clear
that no particular words or phrases are critical to the finding of a trust relationship. "[T]he use of the word 'Trustee' is not absolutely essential to
the finding of a trust relationship when it is otherwise clear that Congress
intended a trust relationship to exist. Rather, the test is whether the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions [contain] an enumeration of duties which would justify the conclusion that Congress intended... [to] establish a fiduciary relationship and define the contours of United State's
fiduciary responsibilities.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also United States v. Ervien, 246 F. 277, 279 (8th Cir. 1917) (reviewing state school lands grant in New Mexico Enabling Act and concluding that "[w]ords
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its intent to create a trust, "Congress need not use any particular form of
words ...and the absence of the words 'trust' or 'trustee' in the conveyance
'6
is not determinative of . . . whether Congress intended to create a trust. '
Rather, "the creation of a trust depends on whether the relevant statutory
provision contains 'an enumeration of duties' which would justify a conclusion that Congress intended to create a trust relationship. 6 2
In District22 Mine Workers v. Utah, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit found the Utah Constitution contains sufficiently
restrictive language to create a state lands trust even though the state's Enabling Act does not. 63 In District22 Mine Workers, members of the United
Mine Workers of America alleged that Utah breached a trust with respect to
lands granted to the state for a miner's hospital when the state used the "trust
corpus and revenue for the benefit of the general public rather than disabled
miners." 64 As in Branson, the court applied the case-specific analysis to
District 22 Mine Workers to determine that Utah's constitution explicitly
states that the lands granted to the state "shall be held in trust., 6' Even
though the specific trust language was present in Utah's constitution, the
court again emphasized that trust language was not determinative of a trust
relationship.66
The Utah Supreme Court's discussion of state school lands and fiduciary duties in National Parks and Conservation Association v. Board of
State Lands is informative.67 The court found that the "duties of a trustee
apply to the state in administering school trust lands. 68 Additionally, trustees' fiduciary duties require trustees "to act only for the benefit of the beneficiaries [the public schools]," which precludes using the value of school

more clearly designed than those of the act of Congress to create definite and specific trusts..
could hardly have been chosen"), aft'd, 251 U.S. 41(1919).
61.
Branson Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d at 634 (citing JicarillaApache Tribe, 782 F.2d at 1564).
62.
Id. (citing JicarillaApache Tribe, 782 F.2d at 1564; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 23 cmt. (a) (1959)).
63.
Dist. 22 United Mine Workers v. Utah, 229 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 2000).
64.
Id. at 984.
65.
Id. at 990.
66.
Id. at 989.
67.
Nat'l Parks and Conservation Ass'n v. Bd. of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 918-21
(Utah 1994).
68.
Id. at 918. The Utah Supreme Court identified many cases outlining the various
duties of the State as trustee. Id. See Ervien v. United States, 251 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1919)
(expending school trust funds to advertise the state unlawful); United States v. 78.61 Acres of
Land, 265 F. Supp. 564, 566-67 (D. Neb. 1967) (asserting sole purpose of placing school
lands in trust was to ensure proceeds used for schools and not general public benefit); State v.
University of Alaska, 624 P.2d 807, 813-14 (Alaska 1981) (requiring full value for sale or
lease of school lands); Gladden Farms Inc. v. State, 633 P.2d 325, 330 (Ariz. 1981) (subsidizing public programs with trust lands not allowed); County of Skamania v. State, 685 P.2d
576, 580 (Wash. 1984) (concluding state school trust lands are subject to a trust obligation
requiring state land managers to seek full value for school lands).
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lands to further other legitimate governmental
interests, "even if there is
69
some indirect benefit to the public schools.
In Oklahoma Education Association v. Nigh, the education association brought an action against the commissioners of the state land office
concerning the leasing of state school lands and loaning of trust funds. 70 The
Oklahoma Supreme Court determined that a State may not use school lands
to subsidize farming and ranching. 7' Therefore, statutes allowing these subsidies are unconstitutional.72 The court also addressed language in Oklahoma's Enabling Act that states the "[i]egislature of the state may prescribe
additional legislation governing such leases" and that land sales "are to be
conducted 'under such rules and regulations as the Legislature of the said
State may prescribe. "' The State alleged that the "literal language of the
[Enabling] Act vest[ed] in the Legislature the authority to enact practically
any rule or regulation it [chose] with regard to selling or leasing the federally
granted land." 74 Pointing out the speciousness of the State's position, the
court asserted that "[c]ommon sense dictates" the Enabling Act be read as a
whole rather than reading the "selected language in isolation from the entire
contextual content of the relevant sections., 75 According to the court, the
"rule making authority granted the Legislature was intended to promote
rather than impede attainment of the manifest objective of the Enabling
Act"-management of the state school trust lands for the benefit of the
State's public schools.76

69.
Nat " Parks and Conservation Ass'n, 869 P.2d 909, 918 (Utah 1994) (citing Ervien v.
United States, 251 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1919) (expending school trust funds to advertise state
unlawful); Lassen v. Ariz. ex rel. Ariz. Highway Dep't, 385 U.S. 458, 466 (1967) (subsidiz-

ing state highway construction with school land trust funds unlawful); Terracor v. Utah Bd. of
State Lands, 716 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1986); Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148-51 (Utah
1983)).
70.
Oklahoma Educ. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 235 (Okla. 1982).
71.
Id. at 236 (relying on holding in Lassen v. Ariz., 385 U.S. at 466, that a State may not
subsidize its highway construction program with school land trust fund assets).
72.
Id. at 235-36. The Oklahoma Supreme Court further explained:
We are not saying under the proper circumstances a preference right to release [sic] trust lands requiring the current lessee to equal or exceed other
bids cannot be given. We are merely saying that a preference right to release given to the current lessee that does not require the payment of a
competitive rate for such lease is violative of the trustee's duty to obtain
the maximum benefit and return to the trust estate.
Id. at 236 n.10.
73.
Id. at 237 (quoting Okla. Enabling Act of 1906, ch. 3335, §§ 9-10, 34 Stat. 267
(1906).

74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
Id.
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Similarly, In State ex rel. Ebke v. Board of EducationalLands &
Funds, the Nebraska Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of legislative restrictions on trust management. 7 The court recognized that while
the legislature had authority to establish rules and regulations, such could

not violate the constitution. 78 The court determined that the state is the trustee of state school lands and that:
A trustee is required to accept the highest bid in the absence

of a cogent reason for not so doing. It is a breach of trust for
a trustee to knowingly handle the property of a trust estate
for the benefit of any person at the expense of the trust estate ....
It is a fundamental principle that79a trustee owes
beneficiaries of a trust his undivided loyalty.
Though prior to Riedel the courts had not analyzed Wyoming's
school lands grant to determine if it is subject to a trust, state lands have

been a repeated focus of the Wyoming Supreme Court.80 As Wyoming's
management of state lands does not distinguish between those lands granted
to the state for the purpose of supporting the state's common schools (school
lands) and lands granted to the state for purposes other than supporting

schools (non-school lands), any decision concerning state lands management
likely would impact both the state's school and non-school lands.81 The
Wyoming Supreme Court's state lands decisions generally fall into three
broad categories: (1) inheritability of state lands leases; (2) the degree of
deference extended to the legislature's and the Board's discretion; and (3)
the incumbent lease-holder's renewal preference and support of grazing and
77.
Ebke v. Bd. of Educ. Lands & Funds, 47 N.W.2d 520 (Neb. 1951).
78.
Id.
79.
Id. at 523.
80.
The author's August 2004 search on WestLaw under "state lands" indicates the
Wyoming Supreme Court addressed the issue at least eighty-four times between 1902 and
2004. This is significant given Wyoming's sparse case law.
81.
See Spahr & Sunderman, supra note 39, at 614 (suggesting single-price grazing fee
misprices many leases and recommending a variable-fee form of pricing be adopted). See
also Jeff Oven & Chris Voigt, Comment, Wyoming's Last Great Range War: The Modern
Debate Over the State's Public School Lands, 34 LAND & WATER L. REv. 75, 91-92 (1999).
The authors discuss the problems created by Wyoming's one-size-fits-all state lands management system. Id. Wyoming does not distinguish between the management of state school
lands and other state-owned lands, but does differentiate school lands' proceeds from the
proceeds of non-school lands. See Wyo. CO NST. art. VII, § 2 (declaring proceeds from lease
or sale of state school lands part of "the perpetual fund for school purposes."); WYo. CONST
art. VII, § 7 (declaring income arising from the perpetual school funds "together with all the
rents of the unsold school lands.., shall be exclusively applied to the support of free schools
in every county in the state"); Wvo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2 (declaring the "proceeds from the
sale and rental of all lands and other property donated, granted or received . . . from the
United States ... shall be inviolably appropriated and applied to the specific purposes specified in the original grant or gift"); Act of Admission for the State of Wyoming, ch. 664, § 5,
26 Stat. 222 (1890) (declaring proceeds from the sale of state school lands to "constitute a
permanent school fund").
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other agricultural interests. 2 The inheritability of state lands leases is beyond the scope of this note, but the precedent established by the last two of
these three categories formed the basis for the court's reasoning in Riedel. 3
Discretion& Deference
Repeatedly, the Wyoming Supreme Court has shown a high level of
deference to the legislature's and the Board's discretion in managing school
lands.8 4 The court has concluded that it would be compelled to uphold the
85
Board "[iln the absence of abuse of discretion or fraud or illegal action.
In Thompson v. Conwell, the Board renewed Conwell's lease even though
Thompson owned land adjoining the leased section, needed the land, and
contended leasing to Conwell was not in the state's best interest.8 6 Thompson claimed that renewing Conwell's lease in light of these circumstances
"was a substantial abuse of discretionary authority and unlawful."" The
Wyoming Supreme Court disagreed with Thompson's claim and found itself
court bound to uphold the Board because granting the lease renewal to Conwell "was a matter within the sound discretion of the... Board. 8 8
In Frolander v. lsley, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld the
Board's decision granting renewal of a grazing lease to the lessee instead of
granting it to an applicant who offered a higher bid. 9 The court reasoned
that "the [B]oard has a large discretion, which can be overturned only" on
limited grounds. 90 Further, the court found an amendment to the renewal
preference statute was intended "to increase the discretion of the [B]oard." 91
Prior to amendment, the statute required the Board to lease lands "for the
greatest benefit and to secure the greatest revenue to the state. 92 The
amended statute removed the requirement "to secure the greatest revenue to

82.
See, e.g., Hawks v. Creswell, 144 P.2d 129 (Wyo. 1943) (passing of right-to-renew
preference to decedent's estate or representative); Thompson v. Conwell, 363 P.2d 927 (Wyo.
1961) (granting lease renewal to incumbent lease-holder within sound discretion of board);
Kerrigan v. Miller, 84 P.2d 724 (Wyo. 1938) (granting renewal of lease of agricultural school
land must recognize state's policy to support ranching business).
83.
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 229-35 (Wyo. 2003).
84.
For examples of the court's deference to the legislature and Board, see Thompson v.
Conwell, 363 P.2d 927, 928 (Wyo. 1961); Rayburne v. Queen, 326 P.2d 1108, 1111 (Wyo.
1958); Frolander v. llsley, 264 P.2d 790, 794 (Wyo. 1953); Howard v. Lindmier, 214 P.2d
737, 739 (Wyo. 1950); Mayor v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 192 P.2d 403, 428 (Wyo. 1948);
Banzhaf v. Swan Co., 148 P.2d 225, 228 (1944).
85.
Thompson, 363 P.2d at 928.
86.
Id.
87. Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Frolander v. lIsley, 264 P.2d 790, 799 (Wyo. 1953).
90.
Id. at 794. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
91.
Frolander, 264 P.2d at 793-94. Compare Wyo. Codified Stat. § 24-113 (BobbsMerrill 1945), with Wyo. Revised Stat. § 91-113 (Courtright 1931).
92.
Wyo. Revised Stat. § 91-113 (Courtright 1931).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2005

13

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 5 [2005], No. 1, Art. 2
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

the state." 9' The court refrained from defining "greatest benefit," reasoning
that "the change in the statute seems to show that the legislature meant to
increase" the Board's discretion.94 However, in Kerriganv. Miller, the court
found the Board's discretion "distinctly limited or regulated" by the legislature's provision for a "preference right of renewal. 95
Right-to-Renew & Support of Grazing
In Frolander v. Jisley, the Wyoming Supreme Court noted, "the
'96
The right-to-renew
preference:

right to renew preference is a very substantialright.

[C]learly shows that the legislature meant to make it the policy of the state to recognize equities in those who have built
up a ranching business in the state which should be considered in passing upon applications for renewal of expiring
leases, and that the absence of such 9policy
would be injuri7
ous if not destructive to that industry.
The extent of the renewal preference's support of Wyoming ranching interests is evidenced in Stauffer v. Johnson.9" In Stauffer, the Board granted the
incumbent rancher's application for renewal at $320 annual rental even
though a competing bid of $3,500 annual rental was received. 99 The court
reasoned that the lessee of the school land and his father were residents of
the state, had used the land for many years, had made valuable improvements which were in large part responsible for the increased value of the
lease, and if the lease were lost the value of the remainder of lessee's ranch
would be seriously impaired.100 The court determined that the Board did not

93.

Wyo. Codified Stat. § 24-113 (Bobbs-Merrill 1945).

94.

Frolander,264 P.2d at 793.

95.
Kerrigan v. Miller, 84 P.2d 724, 729 (Wyo. 1938).
96.
Frolander,264 P.2d at 794 (citation omitted).
97.
Id. (quoting Kerrigan v. Miller, 84 P.2d 724, 729 (Wyo. 1938)).
98.
Stauffer v. Johnson, 259 PR2d 753 (Wyo. 1953).
99.
Id. at 755, 758. Stauffer, a resident of Utah, sub-leased and grazed Johnson's school
lands lease. Id. at 754. Stauffer wanted the lease for grazing, but the Board determined that
his interest in the land was outweighed by Johnson's use of the school section as the base of a
ranching operation. Id. at 755. The Board determined that the land "should serve as a base
ranch like it has in the past for the best interests of the State." Id. The renewal preference
statute in effect in 1953, like the renewal preference statute in effect today, required that state
lands "be leased in such manner and to such parties as shall inure to the greatest benefit to the
state." Wyo. Codified Stat. § 24-113 (Bobbs-Merrill 1945). The 1953 statute lacked the
current requirement that incumbent leaseholders match any competing bids based on FMV for
same or similar use of the land. Compare Wyo. Codified Stat. § 24-113 (Bobbs-Merrill
1945), with Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
100. Stauffer, 259 P.2d at 755,756, 757.
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abuse its discretion in awarding the lease to the incumbent leaseholder, and,
therefore, affirmed the Board's decision.' 0 '
In Bosler v. McKechnie, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld lessee's right-to-renew over a competing lease application and allegations that
the lessee violated the terms of lease and forfeited his right-to-renew by subleasing land without paying one-half of the excess rent to the state.'0 2 The
court concluded that insufficient evidence existed to overturn the Board's
right of renewal
decision and that "refusal to give effect to the preference
03
[would be] a detriment to the interest of the state.'
PRINCIPAL CASE

William Riedel challenged the constitutionality of Wyoming's right-4
to-renew preference in a declaratory judgment case against the Board.'1
The district court issued an order "concluding that the lands were indeed
encumbered by a trust, imposing on the State a fiduciary duty to manage the
lands exclusively for the beneficiaries, the State's common schools."' 0 5 Following this order, the district court addressed the issue of whether the rightto-renew preference is an unconstitutional interference with the State's trust
duties.0 6 The district court granted the intervenor Associations' motion to
dismiss Riedel's claim on the grounds that he "failed to present adequate
evidence that the preferential right to renew violates the State's fiduciary
responsibilities." 0 7 The Wyoming Supreme Court granted Riedel's timely
appeal of the district court's dismissal of his complaint, and the Associations'10cross-appeal of the district court's holding that school lands are held in
trust.

101.
Id.at765.
Bosler v. McKechnie, 362 P.2d 809 (Wyo. 1961). Wyoming statute section 36-5-105
102.
(b) states:
If the lessee of state lands shall assign, sublease or contract all or any part
of the lease area, the lease shall be subject to cancellation unless such assignment or sublease or contract is approved by the director, subject to
criteria established by the board of land commissioners; however, no such
approval shall be arbitrarily or unreasonably withheld and all action upon
each application therefor, shall be such as will inure to the greatest benefit
to the state land trust beneficiaries, provided, that in no event shall the

lands be subleased unless one-half (1/2) of the excess rental is paid to the
state.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
103.
Bosler v. McKechnie, 362 P.2d 809, 813 (Wyo. 1961).
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226.
104.
Id. at 226-27.
105.
!d. at 227.
106.
Id.
107.
108.
Id.
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State School Lands "Trust " Analysis
The Wyoming Supreme Court began its analysis by first addressing
whether state school lands are held in trust and, if so, whether the preferential right-to-renew violates this trust. Reviewing the historical background
of public land grants to the several states for the support of schools, the court
observed the laissez faire approach to state school lands evidenced by the
enabling acts of states admitted to the United States in the early nineteenth
century."' 9 The language of these early state enabling laws did not mention
"trusts, fiduciary obligations, or restrictions on the sale, lease or other use of
the lands."" This early approach contrasts sharply with the "closely regulated express trust conveyances" found in the enabling acts of later-admitted
states such as New Mexico and Arizona."' The court asserted, "Wyoming's
admission, both chronologically and conceptually, falls somewhere between
Congress' laissez faire approach to the states admitted in the early nineteenth century and the closely regulated express trust conveyances to New
Mexico and Arizona.... " 12
The court then reviewed the instances where the Wyoming Constitution addresses state school lands." 3 The court summarized the constitution's
provisions as showing:
[T]he lands are accepted for educational purposes; that the
board of land commissioners is established with authority to
manage, sell or lease the lands as directed by the legislature;
that the proceeds from the sale and lease of the lands shall
constitute a permanent trust fund, with only the income used
for educational purposes; that the lands may be leased on
whatever terms the legislature shall prescribe; and that the

109.
110.
111.

Riedel, 70 P.3d at 227.
Id. (relying on Fairfax et al., supra note 1, at 810, and Budge, supra note 1, at 226).
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 228. The 1912 Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act
[S]tated expressly that the lands granted to the state are held "in trust";
provided that the products and proceeds of the lands "shall be subject to
the same trusts as the lands;" prescribed the manner of advertising, selling
and leasing the lands; directed the method of maintaining and investing

the permanent fund; voided any transaction not in conformity with the
enabling act; and directed the Attorney General of the United States to enforce all provisions related to the trust lands.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 228 (summarizing Arizona-New Mexico Enabling Act, 36 Stat. 557, 56168 (1910)).
112.
Id.at 228.
113.
Id. at 228-29 (quoting WYo. CONST. art. VII, § 2, 6, 7 and art. XVIII, § 1, 2, 3). The

court relied on the text of the constitution as originally adopted in 1891. Id.
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lands may be sold only at public 4auction for at least three-

quarters of their appraised value."

The court noted that the delegates to Wyoming's constitutional convention
in September 1889 borrowed heavily from previously admitted states' con-

stitutions." 5 The court afforded considerable weight to the fact that the constitutions of Colorado, Washington, Idaho, and South Dakota-all of which
the Wyoming Constitution borrowed heavily from-"expressly provided
that the states' school lands were 'held in trust.""' 6 Likewise, the Oklahoma

Constitution, drafted after Wyoming's admission, declared state school lands

and proceeds "a sacred trust.""' 7 The court found Wyoming's constitution
"significant by contrast" as it does not follow the contemporary examples of
the above mentioned states, but instead follows earlier admitted states, such
as Michigan, which "declare a trust in the sale proceeds but not in the lands

themselves."'

8

Based on these observations, the court concluded that

Wyoming's constitution did not create a constitutional trust for the state's
school lands." 9
The court found Riedel had standing to bring his claim as the right-

to-renew preference had "clearly worked to deprive [him] of a lease to the
subject school lands. 1 20 Even if the court had not found Riedel's injury
sufficient to grant his standing, the court stated that it has "recognized a relaxed standing requirement in matters of great public interest or importance," and the court has applied "the great public interest doctrine when a

constitutional question is presented., 12' The court concluded that "the conId. at 232.
114.
Id. at 229 (citing Robert B. Keiter & Tim Newcomb, The Wyoming State Constitu115.
tion: A Reference Guide 1, 4 (1993)).
116. Id. See COLO. CONST. art. IX, § 10 (1876); WASH. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (1889);
IDAHO CONST. art. IX, § 8 (1889); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 7 (1889).
117.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 229. See OKLA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (1907).
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 229. See MICH. CONST. art. X, § 2 (1836).
118.
119.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232.
120.
Id. at 230. The court found Riedel's injury "more direct and personal" than that of
petitioner in Jolley v. State Loan and Inv. Bd, 38 P.3d 1073 (Wyo. 2002). Riedel, 70 P.3d at
230. In Jolley, the petitioner challenged the sufficiency of the Loan and Investment Board's
public meeting schedule. Id. at 1075. Since petitioner's interest in the meeting was as a
reporter and citizen, he was neither aggrieved nor adversely affected by the meeting schedule
change. Id. at 1077. Therefore, the petitioner lacked standing to appeal the board's decision.
Id. at 1079.
121.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 230. The Jolley court traced the development of the great public
interest doctrine, and stated:
Historically, we have applied the great public interest and importance
doctrine to find standing where we ordinarily would not in the following
instances: Washakie County School District Number One, 606 P.2d 310
(constitutionality of school financing); Memorial Hospital of Laramie
County, 770 P.2d 223 (tax exempt status of hospital); State ex rel. Wyoming Association of Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors v. Sulli-
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stitutional challenge to the statute at issue" in Riedel required the court to
"decide the status of the state's obligations with regard to the ...state school
lands."' 22 The court determined that Riedel's challenge of Wyoming's rightto-renew preference was a matter of public importance and, therefore, an
"invoke the great public interest exception to the
appropriate instance to
1 23
standing requirement."
After establishing Riedel's standing, the court turned its attention to
an analysis of the status of school lands in Wyoming. The court first focused on Wyoming's Act of Admission and held that the Act does not create
24
a trust obligation in connection with the state's ownership of school lands.
The court relied on two decisions from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit to reach this conclusion. First, in Branson School DistrictRe-82 v.
Romer, the Tenth Circuit determined that "the question of whether a statehood statute creates a federal trust requires a case-specific analysis of the
particular state's enabling statute because the history of each state's admission to the Union is unique."' 25 The Branson court found that the Colorado
Enabling Act "contains a sufficient enumeration of duties to indicate Congress's intent to create a fiduciary relationship between the state.., and its
common schools.' 26 In Branson, the court also found the Colorado Constitution relevant to its decision as the constitution was adopted immediately
after the Enabling Act and was, therefore, a "contemporaneous expression of
the parties' intent" that state school lands be "held in trust.' 127 Second, in
District 22 United Mine Workers v. Utah, the Tenth Circuit implemented
Branson's case-specific review and concluded that Utah's enabling act gave
too much freedom to the legislature to manage and dispose of state school
lands to create a trust.' 28 However, the Tenth Circuit found Utah's constitution contained explicit trust language and sufficient provisions to create a
trust with respect to those lands granted to the state for the support of the
van, 798 P.2d 826 (Wyo. 1990) (constitutionality of the Wyoming Professional Review Panel Act); Board of County Commissioners of the County
of Laramie v. LaramieCounty School District Number One, 884 P.2d 946
(Wyo. 1994) (entitlement of school district to interest on school district
funds held by county treasurer); and Management Council of the Wyoming Legislature, 953 P.2d 839 (constitutional scope of governor's veto
power).
Jolley, 38 P.3d at 1078.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 230.
122.
Id. at 230-31.
123.

124.
125.

Id. at 231,232.
Id. at 231 (quoting Branson Sch. Dist. Re-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 633 (10th Cir.

1998)).

126. Branson Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d at 634. See infra notes 175-95 and accompanying text
for a discussion of the duties enumerated in the Colorado Enabling Act.
127. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 231 (citing Branson Sch. Dist., 161 F.3d at 634-35).
128. Id. (citing Dist. 22 United Mine Workers v. Utah, 229 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir.
2000)).
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state's common schools.1 29 The Wyoming Supreme Court found that Wyo-

ming's enabling act did not specify "a minimum sales price for its school
lands and expressly authorizes the leasing of the lands in any manner the
state legislature provides," both of which "militate[] against the creation of
an express trust by the Wyoming Act of Admission."' 3
After determining the Wyoming Act of Admission does not create a
trust obligation in connection with the state's ownership of school lands, the
Riedel Court focused on the Wyoming Constitution and determined that it
does not create an express trust of state school lands.' 3 ' The court distinguished between the constitution's articulation of a trust as to the proceeds
from the sale of the lands and the constitution's silence as to the land itself.'3 2 The court also found it significant that Wyoming's Constitution,
which limits the trust to proceeds from the sale of state school lands, was
adopted by the Wyoming Territory in 1889 and was available for Congress's
review when it passed the Wyoming Act of Admission in 1890.33 Therefore, Congress allowed Wyoming to join the union knowing that the state's
constitution limited the trust of lands given to it by the United States to the
proceeds from the sale of such lands. 34 In addition, Wyoming's Constitution gives the legislature latitude to direct the management, sale, or lease of
state lands and to prescribe whatever terms it chooses for the lease of state
lands. 3 ' The court found that the latitude given the legislature and the limitation of the trust language to the proceeds from the lands
36 "militate against a
constitutionally-created trust" in the state school lands.'
Though the court found neither the Wyoming Act of Admission nor
the Wyoming Constitution subjected state school lands to a trust, the court
recognized that the lands were subject to a statutory trust. 37 The court determined that although state land grants may have been informally referred
to as "trust lands" prior to 1997, the 1997 revision of leasing statutes left
3
little doubt that these lands were governed by a statutorily-created trust. 1
129.
Dist. 22 Mine Workers, 229 F.3d at 990.
130.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 231.
131.
Id.
132.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id. The legislature's freedom is restricted by constitutional limits such as the ten-year
maximum length of grazing and agricultural leases. Wyo. Act of Admission, Ch. 664, § 5, 26
Stat. 222 (1890).
136.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232.
137.
Id.
138.
Id. at 233. The Wyoming Legislature amended the leasing statutes in 1997, setting
forth an uncodified statement of principles, which states:
(a) The legislature endorses the following statements of principle and directs that the board of land commissioners and the director of state lands
abide by these statements in the implementation of these statutes:
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The court found that "it is within the legislature's authority
to declare a trust
139
in the school lands" and that the legislature had done SO.
The Statutory Trust and the Right-to-Renew
After holding that state school lands are subject to a statutory trust,
the court determined that the state's preferential right-to-renew preference
does not violate the state's fiduciary duties. 140 The court stated that "the
land trust in Wyoming is a creature of statute.' 14 ' As such, "the statutes
incorporate all of the trustee's duties, and... such arrangement is authorized
by the Act of Admission and the Constitution's express authorization to
"142
lease the lands 'under such regulations as the legislature shall prescribe.
The court dispatched each of Riedel's five constitutional objections to the
state's preferential right-to-renew. 14' First, the court rejected Riedel's claim
that Wyoming's fiduciary duties include receiving "fair market value for
agricultural leases of the common school land grants."' 44 The court asserted,
"any trust in Wyoming is a creation of Wyoming statute, that trust does not
carry with it the duty to maximize revenues.' 14 1 Second, the court rejected
Riedel's argument that the preferential right-to-renew "is tantamount to an
absolute right of renewal," which violates the Wyoming Enabling Act's prohibition against leases longer than ten years thereby depressing lease values

(i) The state land trust, consisting of trust lands, trust minerals and
permanent land funds shall be managed under a total asset management policy;
(ii) The state land trust is intergenerational. Therefore, the focus is

on protecting the corpus for the long term;
(iii) Trust land should remain a substantial, integral component of
the state land trust portfolio. There is no mandate to sell any trust
asset to maximize revenue in the short term;
(iv) All leases of trust land shall assure a return of at least fair market
value considering the management practices and risk assumed by the
lessee when determining fair market value;
(v) Investment policies shall ensure that the earning power of the
permanent land fund is not reduced from the effect of inflation.
1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws Ch. 200, § 3.
139. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 233.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142.

Id. (quoting Wyoming Act of Admission, Ch. 664, § 5, 26 Stat. 222 (1890)).

143.
144.
145.

Id. at 234-35.
Id. at 234.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 234.
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and favoring incumbent leaseholders. 146 The court found the right-to-renew
conditional--"the incumbent must re-apply every ten years, must have met
prior lease payments, must otherwise maintain eligibility, and . . . must
match any higher bid offered for the same land." 4 7 The court noted the evidence presented by Riedel "that the vast majority of leases are renewed by
the incumbent lease holders" did not meet the heavy burden to "clearly and
exactly show the unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.' ' 41 Third,
Riedel argued the right-to-renew preference violates the Wyoming Constitu149
tion's requirement that "school lands be disposed of by public auction.,
The court concluded that "a lease of state lands.., is not a disposal of those
lands and need not be accomplished by public auction."' 150 Fourth, Riedel
contended the right-to-renew "violates the constitutional prohibition on
'granting any privileges to persons who may have settled upon any of the
school lands"' and the court quickly dispatched this argument as nonsensical. "' Fifth, Riedel argued that if the common law governs the trust, the
right-to-renew "depresses the value of agricultural leases and therefore violates the trustees [sic] duty to maximize revenue from the trust lands." ' In
response, the court reasserted its position that the leasing of state school
lands is "governed by the statutes and not by common law trust principles."'1 3 The court concluded summarily: "The legislature will' 5 not
be pre4
sumed to have created the trust and violated it at the same time."'
In closing, the court stated, "the current version [of the right-torenew preference] requires that the renewing lease holder match any competing bid and therefore approximates market value."'55 The court made clear
that Riedel's evidence to the contrary was unconvincing. 15 6 The court stated
146.
Id.
147. Id.
148.
Id. (quoting Reiter v. State, 36 P.3d 586, 589 (Wyo. 2001)).
149.
Id. See Wyo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
150. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 234.
15 i.
Id The court explained that "the lessees of today are not the original settlers contemplated by the Constitution and ... the leasing of the lands is not a 'sale or other disposition' of
the school lands." Id. at 234.
152.
Id. at 235.
153.
Id.
154.
Id.
155.
ld.
156.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 235. Evidence offered by Riedel to support his constitutional objections to section 36-5-105 included expert testimony that:

[I]ncumbent lease holders in Wyoming almost always prevail when there
is a competing lease application, that those leases have a positive "permit
value" when agricultural properties are marketed, and that other states realize more for their leases because they have a variable rather than a single statewide minimum lease rate.
Id. See Brief of Appellant/Appellee William H. Riedel, Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223
(Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60).
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that to conclude from Riedel's offered evidence "that the state is not realizto the level of a breach of
ing sufficient income from its trust lands, rising
'' 57
fiduciary duty, would be sheer speculation.
The court concluded that under the Wyoming Act of Admission and
Constitution, the Wyoming Legislature acted appropriately when it declared
state school lands subject to a statutorily created trust and concurrently provided incumbent leaseholders of those lands with a right-to-renew preference.15 8 For these reasons, the court affirmed the district court's grant of
defendants' motion to dismiss." 9
ANALYSIS

The Wyoming Supreme Court incorrectly determined that Wyoming's state school lands were not subject to a constitutional trust. In rejecting a constitutional trust, the court ignored precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the Wyoming Supreme Court. 6° The Wyoming Supreme Court's stance also contradicted the position advanced by
Wyoming's Attorney General in the state's appellee brief in Riedel.16' If the
court had found a constitutional trust, then the rules of trust law would apply
to the management of school lands and the state would be required to manage the lands for the sole benefit of the state's schools. 62 Under a constitutional trust, Wyoming's right-to-renew preference would be unconstitutional
and creates grazing interests as a beneficias it restricts trust lands revenue
1 63
ary of the school lands trust.
Instead of recognizing a constitutional trust, the court determined
that Wyoming's state school lands are subject only to a statutory trust. 64 In
reaching this conclusion, the court incorrectly found trust language as determinative of the creation of a trust and failed to recognize that the rules of
trust law continue to govern a statutory trust except where specifically altered by a statutory provision.165 Since the statutory provisions signaled by
the court as creating the statutory trust conform with, rather than alter, the
rules of trust law, the rules of trust law continue to govern the statutory
trust.166 The court's failure to recognize that the rules of trust law continue
to control the terms of the statutory trust led the court to incorrectly uphold
157.

Riedel, 70 P.3d at 235.

158.
159.

id.
Id.

160. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 23 1-2. See infra notes 171-222 and accompanying text.
161.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232. See Trust Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming at 10-31,
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60).
162. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
163.
See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
164.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232-33. See RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TRusTs § I cmt. a (2003).
See infra notes 171-222 and accompanying text.
165.
166.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232-33; RESTATEMENT (THRD) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. a (2003).
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Wyoming's preferential right-to-renew. 167 The right-to-renew preference
violates the statutory trust for the same reasons it violates a constitutional
trust: it restricts trust lands revenue
and creates grazing interests as a benefi6
ciary of the school lands trust.1 1
The court declared the state school lands trust and the constitutional-69
ity of the right-to-renew preference issues of "great public interest.'
Therefore, the court's incorrect and incomplete analyses are especially
ironic. The court's holdings in Riedel constructed a school lands trust within
which the right-to-renew preference is constitutional, even though it creates
an artificially isolated market for grazing and other agricultural use of school
lands that restricts income to the trust and creates a beneficiary other than
the state's schools. 70 Certainly this result is not in the "great public interest," but in the interest of ranching.
ConstitutionalTrust
By rejecting a state school lands constitutional trust, the Wyoming
Supreme Court ignored precedent from the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit and the Wyoming Supreme Court and contradicted the position advanced by Wyoming's Attorney General in the state's appellee brief in
Riedel.' 7' In Papasan,the United States Supreme Court advocated a casespecific analysis of states' constitutions and enabling acts to determine the
existence and parameters of school lands trusts.' 72 The Tenth Circuit, in
both Branson and District22 Mine Workers, applied the case-specific analysis advocated by the United States Supreme Court. 173 The Wyoming Supreme Court recognized the use of the case-specific analysis in Papasan,
Branson, and District22 Mine Workers, but failed to apply the test as it had
been applied in those cases to the Wyoming Act of Admission and the
Wyoming Constitution. 74 If the Wyoming Supreme Court had applied the
case-specific analysis as the Tenth Circuit did in Branson, the court would
have determined Wyoming's state school lands are subject to a constitutional
trust.
After performing the case-specific analysis, the Branson court determined that the Colorado Enabling Act contained a "sufficient enumeration
of duties to indicate Congress' intent to create a fiduciary relationship between the state of Colorado and its common schools with respect to the
167.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 233-35.
168.
See infra notes 223-256 and accompanying text.
169.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 230.
170.
See infra notes 257-301 and accompanying text.
171.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232.
172.
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 289-91 n. 18 (1986).
173.
Branson Sch. Dist. Re-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619 (10th Cir. 1998); Dist. 22 Mine
Workers v. Utah, 229 F.3d 982 (10th Cir. 2000).
174.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 231.
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management of the school lands.' 17' The Tenth Circuit recognized that the
language used in Congress' conveyance of state school lands to the statethat the school lands "are hereby granted to the said State for the support of
17 6
The
the common schools"-was insufficient to create a federal trust.
court determined that evidence of Congress' intent to create a trust exists in
section 14 of Colorado's 1875 enabling act, which states:
That the two sections of land in each township herein
granted for the support of common schools shall be disposed
of only at public sale and at a price not less than two dollars
and fifty cents per acre, the proceeds to constitute a permanent school-fund, the interest of which to be expended in the
support of common schools.' 77
Through this section of the enabling act Congress prescribed: "(1) how the
school lands are to be disposed, (2) at what minimum price, (3) how the income from these sales is to be held, (4) what may be done with the interest
on that capital holding, and" (5) the permanence of the benefit of these assets
for the common schools.178 The Branson court recognized that the above
restrictions were imposed to serve Congress' goal of "providing a sound
financial basis for the 'support' of the state's common schools in perpetuity."' 79 The court felt confident, "[iun light of this enumeration," that Congress "intended to create a fiduciary obligation for the state of Colorado to
manage the school lands in trust for the benefit of the state's common
schools."'8 0
When the Branson court's application of the case-specific analysis is
repeated with Wyoming's constitution and enabling act, enumerated duties
nearly identical to those contained in Colorado's enabling act are revealed.
First, both states' documents dictate how the school lands are to be disIn Colorado state school lands must be disposed of at public sale
posed.'
and in Wyoming lands may be disposed of at public auction or at public
sale. 1 2 Second, both states mandate a minimum price at which lands may be
disposed." 3 Colorado requires state school lands be sold for "not less than
175.
Branson, 161 F.3d at 634.
Id. at 634 (citing Alabama v. Schmidt, 232 U.S. 168, 173-74 (1914) (interpreting the
176.
sparse language of the land grants to Michigan and Alabama as creating a solemn agreement,

not a federal trust)).
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at 634 (citing Colorado Enabling Act § 14, 18 Stat. 474, 476 (1875)).
Id.
Id.
Id.

Compare Colorado Enabling Act § 14, 18 Stat. 474, 476 (1875), with WYo. CONST.
181.
art. XVIII, § 1,and Wyo. Act of Admission, ch. 664, § 5, 26 Stat. 222 (1890).
182.
Compare Colorado Enabling Act § 14, with WYo. CONST. art. XVIII, § I, and Wyo.
Act of Admission § 5.
183.
Compare Colorado Enabling Act § 14, with WYo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
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two dollars and fifty cents per acre," while Wyoming insists state school
lands be sold for "not less than three-fourths the appraised value thereof, and
not less than $10 per acre." 18 4 Third, both states indicate how the income
from the sales of state school lands is to be held. 85 In Colorado, the proceeds from the sale of state school lands "constitute a permanent schoolfund.' 1 6 In Wyoming, proceeds from the sale and rental of school lands are
"inviolably appropriated and applied to the purposes specified in the original
grant or gifts."'8 7 Further, money from the sale or lease of state school lands
constitutes a permanent school fund to be maintained and used for the exclusive benefit of the public schools.188 Fourth, both Colorado and Wyoming
provide for the interest on the permanent school fund.' 89 Colorado requires
interest from the permanent school-fund "be expended in support of common schools."' 90 Wyoming requires that only the annual income and interest be appropriated from the school's perpetual fund and said funds "shall be
exclusively applied to the support of free schools."' 9' Finally, both states
provide for the permanence of the state school lands and their benefit to the
common schools.' 92 In Colorado, sections sixteen and thirty-six are granted
to the state for the support of common schools. 93 Wyoming has a nearly
identical provision and assures the permanence of the state school lands by
declaring that "such land shall not be subject to preemption, homestead entry, or any other entry under the land laws
194 of the United States,. . . but shall
be reserved for school purposes only.'
The Branson Court determined that through enumerated duties contained in Colorado's enabling act Congress intended to create a fiduciary
obligation for the state.' 95 Clearly, the Tenth Circuit would reach the same
conclusion if it applied the same analysis to Wyoming's enabling act and
constitution. Admittedly, the Wyoming Act of Admission does not contain a
minimum price for the sale of school lands, but the minimum sales price is
clearly articulated in the Wyoming Constitution. 96 As the Tenth Circuit
recognized the Colorado Enabling Act and the Colorado Constitution as contemporaneous documents that should be considered in concert, the Wyoming
184.
185.

Compare Colorado Enabling Act § 14, with WYO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
Compare Colorado Enabling Act § 14, with WYo. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2, Wyo.
CONST. art. VII, §§ 2, 6, and Wyo. Act of Admission § 5.
186. Colorado Enabling Act § 14.
187. WYO. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
188. WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 2; WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 6; Wyo. Act of Admission § 5.
189. Compare Colorado Enabling Act § 14, with WYO.CONST. art. VII, §§ 2, 6-7, and
Wyo. Act of Admission § 5.
190. Colorado Enabling Act § 14.
191.
WYO. CONST. art. VII, § 7. See also WYO.CONST. art. VII, §§ 2, 6; Wyo. Act of
Admission § 5 (restricting school funds expenditures).
192.
Compare Colorado Enabling Act § 7, with Wyo. Act of Admission §§ 4, 5.
193.
Colorado Enabling Act § 7.
194.
Wyo. Act of Admission §§ 4, 5.
195.
Branson Sch. Dist. Re-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 634 (10th Cir. 1998).
196.
Wyo. CoNsT. art. XVIII, § 1.
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Constitution and Act of Admission should be analyzed with the same regard. 197 When taken together, the two Wyoming documents reveal a constitutional trust that recognizes Congress' intent "to create a fiduciary obligation for the state.., to manage the school lands in trust for the benefit of the
state's common schools." 19
By failing to follow the precedent established by Branson, the Wyoming Supreme Court incorrectly determined that Wyoming's state school
lands are not subject to a constitutional trust, and that the state is not subject
This conclusion
to the fiduciary obligation a trust would imply' 99
foreclosed the court's analysis of Riedel's constitutional claims that the
right-to-renew preference breached the state's fiduciary duties.2 10 If school
lands are not subject to a constitutional trust, then the state does not owe any
fiduciary duties under the trust, and, therefore, the state could not have
breached any fiduciary duties regardless of the right-to-renew preference's
contents. 20 1 The court's finding that state school lands are not subject to a
constitutional trust prevented the court from analyzing Riedel's argument
against the right-to-renew preference from within the parameters of constitutionally imposed trust obligations.2 0 2 If the court had performed this analysis, it likely would have found that the right-to-renew preference violated the
state's fiduciary obligations and was, therefore, unconstitutional on its
face.2 °3
In addition to failing to follow Tenth Circuit precedent, the Wyoming Supreme Court failed to follow its own precedent established in Frolander v. Ilsley.2° In this decision, the court stated, "[slchool lands are, it is

197. Branson, 161 F.3d at 634. The Colorado Enabling Act was passed in 1875 and the
Colorado Constitution was approved a year later in 1876. Id. In an order reverse of most
states, Wyoming's Constitution was approved in 1889, a year before the state was admitted
into the union by the passage of the Wyoming Act of Admission in 1890. Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 228 (Wyo. 2003).
198. Branson, 161 F.3d at 634.
199. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232.
200. Id. at 233-35.
201.
Id. at 232-33.
202. Id.
203. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
204. See Frolander v. lisley, 264 P.2d 790, 799 (Wyo. 1953). Frolander focused on
whether the Board properly awarded a grazing lease to the incumbent leaseholder despite the
competing lease applicant's allegations that the leaseholder had violated the provisions of the
lease. Id. at 791-92. The court examined the fight-to-renew preference and the Board's discretion in awarding renewal leases. Id. at 793-794. The court concluded that school lands are
held in trust by the state, which requires the state's prudent management of the lands. Id. at
799. In upholding the right-to-renew preference, the Frolandercourt stated, "[w]e see no
reason why the interest of the trust and that of the ranchers in the state may not be harmonized
so as to result in the best interest of the state as well as of the schools." Id. at 799. The court
declared both a school lands trust exists and that the trust could constitutionally serve dual
beneficiaries: ranching and the state's schools. Id. Though the court's declaration of a school

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/wlr/vol5/iss1/2

26

Hayano: State School Lands - Disinterest in the Public Interest: The Wyom
2005
CASE NOTE

true, held in trust by the state, and the trust must be administered wisely and
prudently so that its aim may be reasonably attained."20'
The Frolander
court continued by discussing the parameters of the State's fiduciary obligations under the trust.206 In Riedel, the Wyoming Supreme Court only recognized the Frolanderdecision in passing, stating that it was "not necessary..
*to decide whether this Court's use of trust language in Frolanderv. lsley..
*decided the issue [of the existence of a school lands trust] or was dicta that
merely used a colloquial expression to describe the school lands." 207 The
Riedel court dismissed the Frolanderdecision as irrelevant to Riedel's claim
even though the underlying issues of each case appear identical: whether a
school lands trust exists and, if so, the state's fiduciary obligations under
such a trust.20 8 Rather than analyzing Frolanderand determining the precedential weight of the decision for the issues in question in Riedel, the court
dismissed its prior treatment of the issues. °9 In Riedel, the court should
have analyzed Frolanderand either overruled, affirmed, or distinguished its
prior decision from the present case. 210 By failing to conduct this analysis,
the court treated the binding precedent of the Frolandercourt as simply dicta
without any rationale for doing so. 2 1 1 If the court had analyzed its decision
in Frolanderand determined that the case established binding precedent on
the existence of a school lands trust and the state's obligations under such a
trust, the determination would have had serious implications for the Riedel
court. Specifically, the court would have been bound to recognize a school
lands constitutional trust, which would have necessitated the court's analysis
of Riedel's claim that the right-to-renew statute violated the state's fiduciary
obligations under the trust.212 Even if the court determined ultimately that
the right-to-renew preference did not violate the constitutional trust, at least
the court would have conducted its analysis of Riedel's claim within the
proper context.
In addition to rejecting its own precedent and that established by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Wyoming Supreme Court contradicted the Wyoming Attorney General's argument in support of a state

lands trust was correct, basic trust principles preclude dual beneficiaries. See supra notes 16,
19 and accompanying text.
205.
Frolander, 264 P.2d at 799.
206.
Id.
207.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 233.
208.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226. See Frolander, 264 P.2d at 799.
209.
See Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 233 (Wyo. 2003).
210.
See id.
211.
See id.
212.
See Frolander, 264 P.2d at 799; Riedel, 70 P.3d at 226. See also Riedel, 70 P.3d at
233-35, for the court's cursory examination of Riedel's constitutional objections to the rightto-renew preference.
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school lands constitutional trust." 3 The Attorney General's trust brief argued "that the acceptance of school lands in the Wyoming Constitution created a trust" and that counter-arguments "parse[] the constitutional history
and interpretation to arrive at a result lacking any philosophical coherency or
consistency. 21 4 The Attorney General further contended that "[e]very court
which has recently considered the school land trusts has concluded that these
are real, enforceable trusts that impose upon the State the same fiduciary
duties applicable to private trustees., 21 5 The Attorney General rejected the
assertion that there is a trust upon the proceeds, but not upon the lands. 6
According to the Attorney General, this position ignores the constitutional
restrictions on the sale, lease, or other disposal of school lands and "would
make Wyoming the only state to have an artificial separation of the purpose
of holding the lands, and
the purpose of holding the proceeds from the dis217
position of the lands."
The Wyoming Supreme Court's rejection of the Attorney General's
arguments for a constitutional trust again impacted the court's analysis of
Riedel's constitutional claim.2 8 The court did not analyze the constitutionality of the right-to-renew preference within the context of a trust.21 9 If it
had, the court would have at least recognized that the right-to-renew preference creates an artificially isolated market that restricts trust income and
casts ranching as the beneficiary of state school lands. 220 The court's recognition of the renewal preference's role in supporting ranching interests
would have necessitated further analysis to determine if this role violated the
state's fiduciary duties under the trust . ' Instead, the court incorrectly reasoned that neither a constitutional trust nor fiduciary duties under the trust
exist, and, therefore, the right-to-renew preference cannot violate nonexistent fiduciary duties.222
Statu, v Trust
After incorrectly determining that Wyoming's state school lands
were not subject to a constitutional trust, the Wyoming Supreme Court de223
termined that state school lands were subject to a statutory trust.
The
213.
Frolander,264 P.2d at 799; Branson Sch. Dist. Re-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 634
(10th Cir. 1998); Trust Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming at 10-31, Riedel v. Anderson, 70
P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No. 02-60).
214.
Trust Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming at 10, Riedel (No. 02-60).
215.
Trust Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming at 26, Riedel (No. 02-60).
216.
Trust Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming at 30, Riedel (No. 02-60).
217.
Trust Brief of Appellee State of Wyoming at 30, Riedel (No. 02-60).
218.
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 233 (Wyo. 2003).
219.
Id.
220.
WYO. STAT. ANN.36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
221.
See infra note 237 and accompanying text.
222.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 233.
223.
Id. at 232.
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court's declaration and analysis of a school lands statutory trust incorrectly
found express trust language determinative of the creation of the statutory
trust and failed to recognize that the rules of trust law continue to govern2 24a
statutory trust except where specifically altered by a statutory provision.

Failing to determine the controlling terms of the statutory trust led the court
to incorrectly uphold Wyoming's right-to-renew preference even though it
restricts income to the school lands trust in direct conflict with both the rules
of trust law and the specific statutory provisions signaled by the court as
creating the statutory trust. 225 The irony of the resulting situation is appar-

ent. The Wyoming Supreme Court declared that the school lands trust and
the right-to-renew preference were issues of "great public interest," but then
failed to examine how, or even if, the statutory trust and the right-to-renew
226
hec court's analytical followIff the
preference served the public interest.
through had matched its good intentions, the Riedel court would have recognized that the right-to-renew preference conflicted with the terms of the
statutory trust by restricting school lands
227 revenue and serving grazing interests above "the great public interest."
The Wyoming Supreme Court's first error in declaring a statutory
trust is evidenced by the court's equation of express trust language with the
creation of a trust.228 Precedent indicates that the presence or absence 229
of
express trust language is not determinative of the existence of a trust.

Instead of following precedent or articulating reasons for not doing so, the
Wyoming Supreme Court proceeded to analyze whether and when a school
lands trust was established based on the statutes' inclusion or exclusion of
express trust language. 230 The court asserted that the 1997 amendments to
the state lands leasing statutes contained such "explicit trust language" that
clearly the legislature intended "the land grant be subject to a trust." 23' The
court's equation of the appearance of trust language in the statutes to the
creation of a statutory trust paralleled the court's determination that the
Wyoming Constitution and Enabling Act did not create a trust due to the
absence of express trust language in the documents.232 The court reasoned
224.

See infra notes 229, 237 and accompanying text.

225.

Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232-33 (Wyo. 2003); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. a

(2003).
226. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 230.
227. Id. at 233-34.
228. Id. at 232-33.
229. See Dist. 22 Mine Workers v. Utah, 229 F.3d 982, 989 (10th Cir. 2000) ("A settlor is
not required to use any particular form of words in expressing its intent to create a trust, and
the absence of trust language does not preclude the formation of a trust."); Branson Sch. Dist.
Re-82 v. Romer, 161 F.3d 619, 634 (10th Cir. 1998) (affirming the absence or presence of
express trust language not determinative of Congress' intent to create a trust); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 23 cmt. a (1959) (stating it is "immaterial whether or not the settlor
knows that the intended relationship is called a trust").
230. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232-33.
231.
Id. at 233. See also infra note 240 and accompanying text.
232. Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232-33.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2005

29

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 5 [2005], No. 1, Art. 2
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

that the limitation of express trust language to the proceeds of the state
school lands "militates against the creation of an express trust by the Wyoming Act of Admission" and the Wyoming Constitution.233 Clearly, the
court was looking for the "magic words" of an express trust and declined to

find that the Wyoming Constitution or Enabling Act created a trust due to

the absence of trust language.234 By only searching the documents for trust
language, rather than following the precedent of analyzing the documents'
enumeration of duties, the court demonstrates it would rather find a quick

answer than conduct a thorough analysis.23 ' Though the state declared the
existence of a school lands trust to be an issue of "great public interest," the
court's anemic analysis of documents while in search of express trust lan-

guage did not reflect the public's interest in a more thorough and thoughtful
determination of the existence of a school lands trust.236

Coupled with the Wyoming Supreme Court's inaccurate assessment

of express trust language is the court's failure to recognize that the rules of
trust law continue to govern a statutory trust except where the terms are specifically altered by a statutory provision.3 7 To determine the controlling
terms of the statutory trust, the court must first ascertain which statute crethe specific provisions of the statute that reated the trust and then identify
238
placed the rules of trust law.
The Wyoming Supreme Court pointed to two sources for the creation of the statutory trust: the principles expressed in the 1997 Wyoming
Session Laws and Wyoming Statute section 36-5-105.239 The purpose of the

Id. at 231-32.
Id. at 231-34.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 230.
237. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. a (2003) for an explanation of the
relationship between trust law and statutory trusts. The Restatement applies "to trusts that are
established by statute." Id. These statutory trusts are "so similar to express private trusts in
their characteristics [and ] applicable legal principles" ... that... "they are treated as trusts
within the meaning of this Restatement. It is therefore intended that the rules of trust law as
stated in this Restatement apply to these types of custodianships except as otherwise provided
... by the applicable statute." Id. The accompanying Reporter's Notes cite a Utah case to
illustrate the trust created by federal land grants for the support of public schools. Id. (citing
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 P.2d 909, 916-917 (Utah
1993)). The Restatement quotes the case as stating, "the school land trust embraced all the
elements of an express trust, with the state [as] the trustee, holding title only for the purpose
of executing the trust." Id. See also GEORGE G.BOGERT AND GEORGE T. BOGERT, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 29-34 (rev. 2d ed. 1984) (comparing trusts and equitable
charges or conditions); Budge, supra note 1, at 223-24 (stating state trust lands are owned and
were granted "for the specific purpose of providing income to specified beneficiaries-in
most cases, a state's school children").
238. RESTATEMENT (TIRD) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. a (2003).
239.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 232-34. See 1997 Wyo. Session Laws ch. 200, § 3; WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
233.
234.
235.
236.
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statement of principles was to direct the Board's implementation of state
lands statutes. The five principles state:
(i) The state land trust, consisting of trust lands, trust minerals and permanent land funds shall be managed under a total
asset management policy;
(ii) The state land trust is intergenerational. Therefore, the
focus is on protecting the corpus for the long term;
(iii) Trust land should remain a substantial, integral component of the state land trust portfolio. There is no mandate to
sell any trust asset to maximize revenue in the short term;
(iv) All leases of trust land shall assure a return of at least
fair market value considering the management practices and
risk assumed by the lessee when determining fair market
value;
(v) Investment policies shall ensure that the earning power
of the permanent land fund is not reduced from the effect of
inflation.240
This statement of principles conforms with, rather than alters, the rules of
trust law. 24' Therefore, the specific provisions of the statement 42of principles
do not alter the rules of trust law that govern the statutory trust.2
The second source to which the Wyoming Supreme Court pointed
for the creation of the statutory trust is Wyoming Statute section 36-5-105.243
The court indicated that the statutory trust was created by the statute's direction that state school lands be leased "in such manner and to such parties 2as
shall inure to the greatest benefit to the state land trust beneficiaries.", 44
This statutory language requiring that trust lands be managed for the benefit
of the beneficiary conforms with, rather than alters, the rules of trust law.245
240.
1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 200, § 3.
241.
Some debate exists whether a trustee has a narrow duty to maximize revenues or a
more broad duty to manage the trust for the benefit of the beneficiary. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD)OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) and accompanying Comments and Reporter's Notes for a description of trustee's duty to manage trust for benefit of beneficiary. Cf Fairfax et al., supra
note 1, at 841 (unwinding the "deeply ingrained idea" that school lands management is constrained by economic maximization principles).
242.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 1 cmt. a (2003).
243.
Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 233 (Wyo. 2003). See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5105 (LexisNexis 2003).
244.
Id. (quoting Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003)).
245. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 (2003) and accompanying Comments and

Reporter's Notes for a description of trustee's duty to manage the trust for benefit of a beneficiary.
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Given the court's articulation of only the 1997 session laws' statement of
principles and the language quoted above from Wyoming Statute section 365-105 as the sources creating the statutory trust, it appears that the rules of
trust law would control the statutory trust as neither source provides a statutory alteration of the rules of trust law.246
Unfortunately, the court failed to recognize that the rules of trust law
continue to govern a statutory trust except where the terms are specifically
altered by a statutory provision. 247 Instead, the court declared that since the
statutory trust "is a creature of statute ... the statues incorporate all of the
trustee's duties. 214' Regrettably, the court did not further clarify this sweeping statement by specifying which statutes or which provisions of the statutes articulate the terms of the statutory trust. 249 The court created a confusing situation by stating that "statutes" incorporate the trustee's duties without clarifying to which statutes it was referring. 2 0 Further, the court asserted that "[ilt is not necessary, and indeed would be inappropriate, to look
to other states or common law trust principles to define the state's fiduciary
obligations with regard to the school land's statutory trust.",25 1 Though the
court's assertion may be correct in that other states or common law trust
principles should not inform Wyoming's statutory trust, the court overlooked the rules of trust law by ignoring the Restatement provision that
statutory trusts are controlled by the rules of trust law except where the
terms are altered by specific statutory provisions. 25 2 Clearly, the court's
position that "[t]he legislature will not be presumed to have created the [state
school lands] trust and violated it at the same time" provided little instruction as to what trust terms actually controlled the statutory trust.2"
The 1997 Session Laws statement of principles and the quoted language from Wyoming Statute section 36-5-105 were the only statutory provisions specified by the court as creating the statutory trust. 5 4 By default,
these provisions, in conjunction with the rules of trust law, control the terms
of the statutory trust. 255 The court's sweeping assertion that the statutory
trust "is a creature of statute" and, therefore, "the statues incorporate all of
the trustee's duties" provided no guidance as to the controlling terms of the
trust beyond the two statutory provisions the court specified.25 6 If the court

246.
247.
248.
249.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § I cmt. a (2003).
See supra note 237 and accompanying text.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 233.
Id.

250.
251.

Id.
Id.

252.
253.

RESTATEMENT

254.

Id. at 232-34.

255.
256.

See supra notes 237-245 and accompanying text.
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 233.

(THiRD) OF
Riedel, 70 P.3d at 235.

TRUSTS § I cmt.

a (2003).
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continues to maintain that Wyoming's school lands are subject to a statutory
trust, it is essential that the court clarify the terms controlling the trust.
Right-to-Renew Preference
Failing to determine the controlling terms of the statutory trust led
the court to incorrectly uphold Wyoming's right-to-renew preference.257
The court erroneously upheld the right-to-renew preference even though it
restricts income to the school lands trust, which directly conflicts with the
rules of trust law and the two specific statutory sources the court identified
as creating the statutory trust.255 Under the rules of trust law, state school
lands form the corpus of a trust that is administered by the Board, as trustee,
for the benefit of the state's school beneficiaries. 259 Under the only specific
statutory language the court indicated created the statutory trust, the same
tenets are affirmed. 260 The 1997 session laws' statement of purpose indicates state trust lands "shall be managed under a total asset management
policy" with a long term, intergenerational focus and "[a]ll leases of trust
land shall assure a return of at least fair market value. 2 61 Wyoming Statute
36-5-105 states that the school lands shall be leased "in such manner and to
such parties as shall inure to the greatest benefit to the state land trust beneficiaries."262
Ironically, the court specifies the above quoted language from Wyoming Statute section 36-5-105 as one of two statutory sources of the
statutory trust terms, but language contained later in the same statute articulates the right-to-renew preference, which violates the terms of the statutory
trust.161 The right-to-renew preference states that an incumbent lease-holder,
who has paid the lease rental and not violated the terms of the lease, "shall
have a preferred right to renew such lease by meeting the highest bid offered
which is based on the fair market value . . . for the same or a similar use of
the land.' '264 This preference violates the terms of the statutory trust whether
they are supplied by the rules of trust law or specific statutory provisions. 261
In addition, if the Wyoming Supreme Court had correctly recognized a constitutional trust, rather than declaring a statutory trust, the right-to-renew
preference would violate the constitutional trust terms as well.266

257.
258.

Id. at 233-35.
See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.

259.

See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.

260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See supra notes 237-45 and accompanying text.
1997 Wyo. Sess. Laws ch. 200, § 3.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 237-255 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 237-255 and accompanying text.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 2005

33

Wyoming Law Review, Vol. 5 [2005], No. 1, Art. 2
WYOMING LAW REVIEW

Vol. 5

Regardless whether the terms of the school lands trust are constitutionally or statutorily imposed, the right-to-renew preference violates the
trustee's duty to manage the trust for the greatest benefit of the beneficiaries.267 The "greatest benefit" includes receiving FMV for agricultural leases
of state school lands and the "same or similar use" provision of the right-torenew preference violates this duty. 268 Further, as Riedel correctly argued,
the right-to-renew preference violates the trust terms by depressing revenue
from agricultural leases by foreclosing other possible uses of the land and
thereby restricting revenue from the trust lands. 269 The right-to-renew preference requires that the holder of an expiring lease have a preferred right to
renew the lease "by meeting the highest bid offered which is based on the
fair market value. . . for the same or a similar use of the land., 27 0 Under this
formulation, the lessee only has to meet those bids that are based on a valuation of the land for the same or similar use.27' Therefore, the value of a grazing lease is determined by the value of the leased land for grazing. A substantially higher bid for the lease would suggest that the competing bidder
valued the land for a purpose other than grazing and the bid could be rejected under the terms of the statute. 2 72 Rather than managing the state
school lands for the greatest benefit of the state's schools, the "same or similar use" provision of the right-to-renew preference protects grazing and other
agricultural interests. The provision ensures that prices for grazing leases
remain low by requiring the incumbent lessee to match only those competing
273
bids that anticipate using the land in the same or similar way.

267.
See supra note 237 and accompanying text. See also Sally K. Fairfax & Andrea
Issod, Trust Principles as a Tool for Grazing Reform: Learningfrom Four State Cases, 33
ENVTL. L 341 (2003) (discussing how trust principles are playing out in grazing cases in
Arizona, Idaho, New Mexico, and Oregon and the difficulty of enforcing trust notions in the

courts).
268.

See supra note 237 and accompanying text; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (Lex-

isNexis 2003).
269.
270.
271.
272.

Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 234-35 (Wyo. 2003).
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
Id.
See id. § 36-5-105. See also Oven & Voigt, supra note 81, at 85, which states:
[A]s a result of Wyoming statute section § 36-5-105(a), a potential lessee,
with a desire to offer more than the set "fair market value" could lose the

opportunity to lease state land to an existing leaseholder .... [T]he statutory framework artificially restrains true "free-market bidding" by capping rental values to a formula based on industry viability... [and] industry stability. The public school fund loses out on the revenue that could
have been gained if the process had been opened up to true competitive
bidding.
Id. (citations omitted).
273. See WYo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003). See also Fairfax et al., supra

note 1, at 868-69 (using school lands to support agricultural community "increasingly under
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The right-to-renew preference's FMV formula further conflicts with
the state's fiduciary obligations.2 74 By statute, the Board is required to develop a formula to assess the FMV of state lands leases. 275 This formula
must be developed pursuant to Wyoming Statute section 36-5-101 (b), which
requires the Board to adopt a FMV formula based on the following criteria:
(i) Readily available data averaged over an adequate number
of years to remove any radical fluctuations;
(ii) Factors which reasonably reflect the true market value of
state leases;
(iii) Parameters within which the board can be responsive to
changing resource conditions, market demand and industry
viability;
(iv) Factors which reasonably reflect the contributions made
by the lessee. 276
The Board uses a comparable sales technique to determine FMV.277
The FMV "is derived by comparing the property being appraised to similar
properties that have been sold recently. ' '278 The Board states that by using
the comparable sales technique the FMV is dependent on two factors: "[T]he
proposed nature and scope of the requested use of the surface; and an analysis of market data for similar uses of lands in the same area. 279 The statutorily mandated criteria in conjunction with the Board's adopted policy ensure
that lands leased for grazing and other agricultural purposes have an FMV
that reflects only this limited use. 28 ' The incumbent lessee is only required
to meet competing bids based on the FMV.28' The Board may exclude a
higher competing bid if the bid is based on an FMV that reflects a different
and/or more profitable use.282 Just as the statute requires competing bids be
"for the same or a similar use" of the leased land, the statute requires the

attack in the courts" as such management strategies benefit ranching at the expense of reducing revenue to the school trust funds).
274.
See Spahr & Sunderman, supra note 39, for a discussion of FMV and variable-fee
grazing leases based on FMV.
275.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003).
276.
Id. § 36-5-101 (b).
277. STATE OF WYO. BD. OF LAND COMM'RS R. & REGS. HANDBOOK, SURFACE AND
MINERAL ESTATE, 3, at http://www.slf-web.state.wy.us/ami/adobe/SURFACE3.pdf (2004).
278.
Id.
279.
Id.
280. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-101 (b)(2003); STATE OF WYo. BD.OF LAND COMM'RS R. &
REGs. HANDBOOK, SURFACE AND MINERAL ESTATE, p. 3, at http://www.slfweb.state.wy.us/ami/adobe/SURFACE3.pdf (2004).
281.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (a), (e) (LexisNexis 2003).
282.
See id.
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283

FMV be based on the same narrow criteria.
Again, the provision ensures
that prices for grazing leases remain low by requiring incumbent lessee to
match only those competing bids that reflect an FMV based on the same or
similar use of the land.284
The right-to-renew preference requires that incumbent lease-holders
only have to match competing bids that reflect an FMV based on the same or
similar use of the land, which could potentially benefit grazing and other
agricultural interests to the exclusion of the intended beneficiaries of the
state school land trust-Wyoming's schools. 285 Granted, if the state's supplement of grazing through the requirements of the right-to-renew preference enables the state to lease school lands that would otherwise not be
leased, then the income to the school's permanent trust fund is increased.28 6
However, if the right-to-renew requirements serve to keep state school lands
locked indefinitely in agricultural leases generating minimal income, then
the right-to-renew preference violates the state's fiduciary duties regardless
whether the trust is constitutionally or statutorily created. 287 If the right-torenew preference creates dual beneficiaries-the state's schools and the
state's ranchers-the preference violates constitutionally and statutorily imposed terms of the trust that require trustees to manage the trust for the benefit of the beneficiary.2 8 In those instances where state school lands could be
managed to increase the benefit to the trust, but are locked in agricultural
leases due to the incumbent lease-holder's right to renew, the state has prioritized ranching interests over the interests of Wyoming schools. Clearly
this violates the state's fiduciary duties to manage school trust lands for the
benefit of Wyoming's schools.
As Riedel correctly argued, the right-to-renew preference also depresses the value of agricultural leases by foreclosing other possible uses of

283.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (a), (e) (LexisNexis 2003).
284. See id. See also Oven & Voigt, supra note 81, at 92-93 ("A system that contains a
statewide renewal preference and artificially restricted lease prices, such as Wyoming's, can
result in the public schools being harmed in both the long- and short-terrm").
285.
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003). See supra note 237 and accompanying text. See also Oven & Voigt, supra note 8 1, at 92.
286.
See Fairfax et al., supra note 1, at 908-09 (asserting trust land management mandates
are more flexible than might first appear and that they allow trust lands managers to address
"the relationship between the trust lands and resources and the beneficiaries").
287.
See 63C Am.JUR. 2D Public Lands § 63 (2004) (summarizing state's role as trustee of
school land grants). See supra notes 67-79 and accompanying text for discussion of fiduciary
duties. But see Daniel J. Chasan, A Trust for All the People: Rethinking the Management of
Washington's State Forests, 24 SEATTLE U. L. Rev. 1, 1-2 (2000) (advocating a broader public trust that rejects the trust principle of undivided loyalty in order to safeguard environmental and aesthetic values of public lands).
288.
See supra note 287. See also Oven & Voigt, supra note 81, at 92 (discussing Wyoming's creation of dual beneficiaries of state school lands).
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the land and thus restricting revenue from the trust lands. 289 According to
the constitutional and statutory terms of the trust, trustees have a duty to
make the trust productive and to preserve and protect the trust property. 290

When the "duty to make the trust productive" conflicts with the "duty to
preserve and care for the trust," the trustee "must act as a prudent investor."29' Rather than requiring the Board to manage school lands in order to
maximize revenue, the terms of the trust require the Board to manage the
lands to obtain the "greatest benefit to the state land trust beneficiaries. 292
Revenue maximization may be the greatest benefit to the trust in some in-

stances, but not in all.2 93 Often, the "highest bid rate is only half of the equation. Obtaining the lessee who will utilize the best management techniques
is another measure of legitimate advantage to the beneficiaries. 2 94 Argu-

ments for maximum revenue from the school lands trust are flawed as they
focus solely on the trust's short-term gains at the expense of the long-term
security and stability of the trust.2 95 If the right-to-renew preference were
eliminated in order to allow maximum revenue to the trust, this situation

would be no more in the public interest than the current situation where the
restricts income to the trust by granting preference to
right-to-renew statute 96
the ranching industry.
A recent Montana case found the right-to-renew preference unconstitutional and not in the public interest.2 97 Montana's First District Court
found that the right-to-renew preference removed the discretion of the lands
board to make leasing decisions based on the best interests of the trust and
the trust's beneficiaries, the state's schools. 298 The discretion instead rested

in the hands of the incumbent lessee, who could chose whether to renew the
289. See Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223, 235 (Wyo. 2003). See also Brief of Appellant/Appellee William H. Riedel at 21-23, Riedel v. Anderson, 70 P.3d 223 (Wyo. 2003) (No.
02-60).
290. See supra notes 16, 67-79, 237 and accompanying text for a discussion of statutory
and constitutional trust terms and fiduciary duties.
291.
Fairfax et al., supra note 1, at 851-852.
292.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003). See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
293. See Budge, supra note 1,at 223-24 (discussing the difficulty state school lands trustees have adopting "ecosystems management" and "balanced environmental management"
due to the legal obligation to seek maximum return for sale or lease of school lands).
294. Broadbent v. Montana, No. BDV-2003-361 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. July 15, 2004)
(holding right-to-renew statute unconstitutional as it removes Board's discretion in determining lease that will achieve the greatest benefit for beneficiaries). See infra notes 297-299 and
accompanying text.
295. See Fairfax et al., supra note I, at 909 ("[M]anagement for revenue within the trust
principle typically leads-and is required to lead--to conservative decisions, especially in
regard to long-term rather than short-term management, because of the requirement to protect
the corpus of the trust.").
296. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 36-5-105 (LexisNexis 2003). See also Fairfax et al., supra
note I, at 909.
297. Broadbent v. Montana, No. BDV-2003-361 (Mont. Ist Judicial Dist. July 15, 2004).
298. Id. 10-16.
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lease based on his or her own interests and not on the best interests of the
trust or the trust's beneficiaries.2 99 The same situation exists in Wyoming.
Though the court claims that Wyoming's renewal preference is discretionary, the minimum standards an incumbent leaseholder must meet in order to
renew an expiring lease overwhelmingly allow the lessee to chose whether
to renew. 300 As in the Montana decision, this precludes the Board's discretion in determining what use and which lessee would bring the greatest benefit to the school lands trust.
The public interest is not served by the court's analysis of the state
school lands statutory trust. The court's analysis incorrectly found express
trust language as determinative of the creation of the statutory trust and
failed to recognize that the rules of trust law continue to govern a statutory
trust except where specifically altered by a statutory provision. 3'
The
court's error in rejecting a constitutional trust and in failing to determine the
controlling terms of the statutory trust led the court to incorrectly uphold
Wyoming's right-to-renew preference.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court missed the opportunity presented in
Riedel to define the great public interest in Wyoming's state school lands.
Instead, the court incorrectly and incompletely analyzed the issues presented
by the case. A more thorough analysis by the court would have led to the
conclusion that Wyoming's state school lands are subject to a trust constitutionally created at the moment Wyoming joined the union. A constitutional
trust would require that the school lands trust benefit only the state's
schools; therefore, the right-to-renew preference would have been found
unconstitutional as it creates grazing interests as a beneficiary of the school
lands trust. In addition, the court's declaration of a statutory trust failed to
recognize the role of trust law in statutory trusts or determine the controlling
terms of the trust. By not analyzing the controlling terms of the trust, the
court incorrectly upheld the right-to-renew preference even though it violates the state's fiduciary obligations under the statutory trust.
In order to meet the fiduciary obligations of a trustee, the Board
must be able to examine all possible uses for school lands leases and determine which uses best meet the terms of the trust. The current right-to-renew
preference, in particular the provision requiring lease applications for an
expiring lease be for the same or similar use of the land, prevents the Board
299.

Id. at 12.

300. Compare Huckfeldt v. State Bd. of Sch. Land Comm'rs, 122 P. 94 (Wyo. 1912) (explaining that right of renewal is not an absolute, vested right, but involves Board's discretion),
with Broadbent v. Montana, No. BDV-2003-361 (Mont. 1st Judicial Dist. July 15, 2004)
(holding right-to-renew eliminates Board's discretion).
301. See supra notes 227- 236 and accompanying text.
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from exploring other possible uses of school lands leases. Admittedly, a
large portion of the state's grazing leases is suited almost exclusively for that
narrow purpose. Unfortunately, one can only speculate as to other possible
uses of grazing leases, as the Board is unable to accept competing lease applications that envision a use other than grazing. If the "same or similar use"
provision of the right-to-renew preference were removed and the Board were
allowed to accept bids for other uses, it does not seem far-fetched to postulate that other interests would make use of school lands leases. Given the
current sociopolitical climate in the West, conservation, environmental, recreation, and hunting interests all could potentially out-bid ranchers in an
attempt to protect watersheds, riparian zones, or other
30 2 critical habitat, or
increase access to recreation or hunting opportunities.
To administer a trust as important as the school lands trust, the
Board must have full discretion to choose the use of the school land that best
meets the terms of the trust. With the current right-to-renew preference, the
discretion rests with the incumbent leaseholder to renew as it best suits his or
her needs. State school lands and the state's fiduciary obligations under a
school lands trust are issues of great public interest; to better serve this interest the "same or similar use" provision of the right-to-renew preference
should be removed. Removal of this provision would allow the Board to
consider all applications for the lease and choose the application that best
meets the terms of the trust. Removal of the "same or similar use" provision
would still allow incumbent lease-holders a renewal preference, but would
require the lease-holder to match any higher bid the Board found acceptable,
not just the bids that were based on the FMV of the land for the same or
similar use. In this situation, the Board can select the ideal application-one
that brings the greatest benefit to the school lands trust while incurring the
least amount of damage to the trust corpus-without either unjustly excluding or favoring grazing interests.
DELISSA HAYANO

Fairfax & Issod, supra note 267, at 345 ("In at least four jurisdictions-Arizona,
302.
Idaho, New Mexico, and Oregon-environmental groups have attempted to bid against
ranchers in hopes of leasing state lands traditionally used for grazing.").
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